Journal of Natural Resources &
Environmental Law
Volume 4
Issue 1 Journal of Mineral Law & Policy, volume
4, issue 1

Article 8

January 1988

Constitutional Validity of The Kentucky Unmined Coal Tax: Gillis v.
Yount
Robin L. Fields
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Fields, Robin L. (1988) "Constitutional Validity of The Kentucky Unmined Coal Tax: Gillis v. Yount," Journal
of Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol4/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Constitutional Validity of The
Kentucky Unmined Coal Tax:
Gillis v. Yount
INTRODUCTION

For over a decade, owners of unmined coal in Kentucky have
been allowed a substantial tax benefit by statutory enactment.'
In 1976, the Kentucky General Assembly created a separate class
of property by severing unmined coal from the class of real
property. 2 By creating a distinct class of property, the General
Assembly allegedly had the constitutional authority3 to tax unmined coal at the low rate of one-tenth of one cent (.001) per
one hundred dollars ($100) value assessed. 4 Furthermore, the
General Assembly allegedly acted without overreaching the limitations on legislative classification provided by the Kentucky
Constitution.' On March 3, 1988, the Kentucky Supreme Court
classify
redefined the constitutional authority of the legislature to
6
Yount.
v.
Gillis
in
purposes
taxation
real property for
This Comment examines the constitutional validity of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 132.020(5) which hinges
upon the amount of authority historically 7 given to the legislature
to create classifications' for taxation purposes. Primarily, the
Comment addresses the degree of legislative authority which
exceeds limitations imposed by uniformity, 9 real property equalKy. REv. STAT. ANN. § 132.020(5) (Bobbs-Merrill 1988) [hereinafter KRS].
Act of March 29, 1976, ch. 84, § 7, 1976 Ky. Acts 168 (codified as amended at
KRS § 132.020).
3 KY. CONST. § 171.
" Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 116, § 3, 1978 Ky. Acts 239, 241 (codified at KRS
2

§ 132.020).
KY. CONST. § 3.
Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988).
See infra notes 15-40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-68, 100-03 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
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ity, ° and exemption restrictions." The Comment further ad4
3
dresses the effect 12 and possible future implications of Gillis.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Several constitutional provisions support the basic concepts
governing taxation on property in the state of Kentucky. 5 Generally, Kentucky's Constitution 6 provides that no property shall
be exempt from taxation except as provided within the Consti-

tution.

7

Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution then carves

out the specific allotments of property as exceptions to this

rule.'" Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution requires unifor10See

infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 69-114 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text.
14748 S.W.2d 357.
KY. CONST. §§ 3, 170-172, 174.
KY. CONST. (1792, amended 1799, 1850, 1891).
17 KY. CONST. § 3 as follows:
Men are equal-No exclusive grant except for public services-Property
not to be exempted from taxation-Grants revocable.-All men, when they
form a social compact, are equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate
public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men,
except in consideration of public services; but no property shall be exempt
from taxation except as provided in this Constitution and every grant of a
franchise, privilege or exemption, shall remain subject to revocation, alteration or amendment. (emphasis added).
" KY. CONST. § 170 (1850, amended 1891) as follows:
Property exempt from taxation-Cities may exempt factories for five years.
There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for public
purposes; places actually used for religious worship, with the grounds
attached thereto and used and appurtenant to the house of worship, not
exceeding one-half acre in cities or towns, and not exceeding two acres in
the country; places of burial not held for private or corporate profit,
institutions or purely public charity, and institutions of education not used
or employed for gain by any person or corporation, and the income of
which is devoted solely to the cause of education, public libraries, their
endowments, and the income of such property as is used exclusively for
their maintenance; all parsonages or residences owned by any religious
society, and occupied as a home, and for no other purpose, by the minister
of any religion, with not exceeding one-half acre of ground in towns and
cities and two acres of ground in the country appurtenant thereto; household goods of a person used in his home; crops grown in the year in which
the assessment is made, and in the hands of the producer; (homestead
provision omitted). All laws exempting or omitting property from taxation
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mity of taxation 9 upon all property of the same class 20 and
Section 172 determines the rate of assessment. 2 Finally, Section
174 stipulates that all property shall be taxed in proportion to
22
its value.
The state of Kentucky, when originally founded, preserved
Virginia's system 23 of specific taxation. 24 Kentucky adopted

other than the property above mentioned shall be void. The general assembly may authorize any incorporated city or town to exempt manufacturing
establishments from municipal taxation, for a period not to exceed five
years, as an inducement to their location.
19 KY. CONST. § 171 (1891,
amended 1915) as follows:
State tax to be levied-Taxes to be levied and collected for public purposes
only and by general laws, and to be uniform within classes-Classification
of property for taxation-Bonds exempt-Referendum on act classifying
property.-The General Assembly shall provide by law an annual tax,
which, with other resources, shall be sufficient to defray the estimated
expenses of the Commonwealth for each fiscal year. Taxes shall be levied
and collected for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all
property of the same class subject to taxation within the territorial limits
of the authority levying the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected
by general laws.
The General Assembly shall have power to divide property into classes and
to determine what class or classes of property shall be subject to local
taxation. Bonds of the state and of counties, municipalities, taxing and
school districts shall not be subject to taxation.
(Referendum provision omitted).
20

Id.

KY. CONST. § 172 is as follows:
All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be
assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would
bring at a fair voluntary sale; and any officer, or other person authorized
to assess values for taxation, who shall commit any willful error in the
performance of his duty, shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance, and upon
conviction thereof shall forfeit his office, and be otherwise punished as
may be provided by law.
22 KY. CONST. § 174 is as follows:
Property to be taxed according to value, whether corporate or individualIncome, license and franchise taxes.-All property, whether owned by
natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value,
unless exempted by this Constitution; and all corporate property shall pay
the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. Nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to prevent the General Assembly from
providing for taxation based on income, licenses or franchises.
22 Kentucky became a commonwealth in 1792, severing ties with Virginia, but
preserving Virginia's system of taxation. See generally N. TAFF, HISTORY OF STATE
REVENUE AND TAXATION IN KENTUCKY (1931)(general background of the progression of
Kentucky taxation); see also LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMfMSSION RESEARCH REPORT No.
21
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the ad valorem system of taxation in 1814,25 and this property
tax supplied the large majority of tax revenues.2 6 Kentucky's
first three constitutions 27 had no guidelines for tax legisla28
tion.
The first relevant debate on revenue and taxation took place
on January 9, 1891,29 resulting in a general property tax30 with
specific exemptions. 3 Although the intent of these framers was
"to let the weight of taxation rest equally on all,''32 inequalities
in the general property tax required the taxation sections of the
Kentucky Constitution to be the first amended." Most significantly, Section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution was amended
to retreat from the older concept of subjecting all property in
the state to the same mode and rate of taxation. The amended
34
version of Section 171 simply required uniformity within a class.
Change was achieved by allowing the legislature to separate
property into distinct categories" for taxation purposes.

137, A CrTIzEN's GUIDE TO THE KENTUCKY CONSTrrUTION 75-98 (revised 1987) (includes
explanation to citizen of Kentucky's scheme of taxation).
1,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1308 (5th ed. 1979). "A' tax imposed as a fixed sum
on each article or item or property of a given class or kind, without regard to its value;
opposed to ad valorem tax." Id.
21 Id. at 48 ("[d]uty is laid in
the form of a percentage on the value of the
property .. ").
11 TAFF, supra note 23, at 59-61.
21 See supra note 16.
u But see City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513 (1840)(allowed
exemption from taxation individuals or corporations who had performed a public service.)
29

DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: OFFICIAL REPORT, VOL. II & 111,

2372-2820 (1890-91) [hereinafter DEBATES].
11 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1308 (5th ed. 1979). A property tax is a "[g]eneric
term describing a tax levied on the basis of the value of either personal or real property
owned by the taxpayer." Id.
31 KY. CONST. § 170 (1850, amended 1891).
31 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 2382 (statement of Mr. P. Johnston, Chairman of
Committee on Revenue and Taxation). "If the burden is born equally by all, it rests
lightly upon all .... If you exempt .the property of one man, or class of men, you
thereby put the burden on the shoulder of the remainder." Id.
11 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TAX COMMISSION, 73 (1915). It attempted to tax [a]
"book account upon which interest is rarely charged . . . upon the same basis as an
iron mine, and the family cook stove on the same basis as a street railway." Id.
3"See supra note 19.
177 S.W. 398, 399 (Ky. 1909) (relating to
" Commonwealth v. Walsh's Trustee,
legislative discretion in taxation of corporate stock); Commonwealth v. Hemingray's
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More than fifty years later, in 1976, the Kentucky General
Assembly amended K.R.S. section 132.020 by adding subsection
6
(5), which created a separate classification for unmined coal.1
Ironically, unmined coal was taxed at the same rate as all real
property, even though separated within the statute.3 7 Perhaps
the action taken in 1976 was in anticipation of the course taken
in 1978 when the legislature reduced the rate of unmined coal
under K.R.S. section 132.020(5) from thirty-one and one-half
cents per 100 dollars of real property valued,3" to 0.10 cents per
100 dollars of real property valued.3 9 Currently, any increase in
ad valorem taxation on real property which exceeds four percent
over the amount of revenue produced in the preceding year, 4° is
prohibited.
II.

THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE

Although the legislature concededly possesses constitutional
authority to make classifications in property taxation, 41 interpretations over the extent of this authority vary. Major disputes
arise in allocating legislative discretion to draw these property
classes. Notably, legislative discretion must be curbed to remain
within constitutional limitations.42
A.

Uniformity

The first three constitutions of Kentucky contained no provisions dealing with the uniformity of taxation.4 3 Kentucky courts

Ex'r., 215 S.W.2d 69 (1919) (power of legislature to limit time for assessment of omitted
property).
36 KRS § 132.020.
37 Act of March 29, 1976, ch. 84, § 7, 1976 Ky. Acts 167, 168 (codified at KRS §
132.020).
31 Taxation of real property was at 31.5 cents per 100 dollars of value assessed;
at this time, unmined coal was equally taxed at the rate of 31.5 cents per 100 dollars of
value assessed, but was designated a separate class by subsection (5).
"9 Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 116, § 3, 1978 Ky. Acts 239, 241 (codified at KRS
§ 132.020).
- KRS § 132.020(7) (Baldwin 1979 Extra Session ch. 25 § 3).
" See supra note 19, 35 and accompanying text.
"2See W. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND QUALITY tN STATE TAxATION (1984)(examines the meaning of "uniformity" of taxation, and the limits thereon,
by comparing the 50 constitutional states).
4" See supra note 16.
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originally relied on the opinion of City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs4 as authority for imposing equality in taxation.
However, the rationale in McQuillan imposing uniformity as a
general limitation on the ability to tax was based on the notions
of fundamental common law. 45 Specific constitutional provisions
as applicable to taxation were not addressed. This idea of uniformity and equality in taxation as a constitutional command
without specific reference to a constitutional provision was accepted as sufficient justification in subsequent cases. 46
Yet, in 1915, an amendment to Section 171 of the Kentucky
Constitution added the phrase "of the same class" to modify
property and allowed property to be classified for the purpose
of applying different rates to different classes. 47 Section 172
contains a separate requirement concerning the permissible
method of taxing property. 48 This section provides that all property, not exempt from taxation by the Kentucky Constitution,
shall be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value. 49 The Kentucky Court of Appeals reaffirmed the full-value standard in
1965 in the court's decision of Russman v. Luckett5 0 Thus the
legislature was given the power to classify real property for
taxation. 1 However, a class would be exempted from taxation
only under a specific provision of the Kentucky Constitution.

" 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 513 (1840).
4 Id. at 516-17 (noting "[Taxation is] limited by some of the declared ends and
principles of the fundamental law. Among these political ends and principles, equality,
as far as practicable, and security of property against irresponsible power, are eminently
conspicuous in our State Constitution.").
" See, e.g., Pearson v. Zable, 78 Ky. 170 (1879); Preston v. Roberts, 75 Ky. (12
Bush) 570 (1877); City of Louisville v. Hyatt, 41 Ky. (1 B.Mon.) 177 (1841). But see
Howell v. Bristol, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 493 (1871)(inequality as a violation of taking clause).
47 KY. CONST. § 171 (1891, amended 1915). See NEWHOUSE, supra note 42, at
559.
41See supra note 21.
,9 See Raydure v. Bd. of Supervisors, 209 S.W. 19 (Ky. 1919) (taxation of oil
leases and value of property assessed).
'o 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965) (a group of taxpayers challenged the Kentucky Dept.
of Revenue for allowing inequalities in valuation).
11Williams' Adm'r. v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 143 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1940). See,
e.g., Kentucky Bank and Trust Co. v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 310 S.W. 2d 287
(Ky. 1958); Commonwealth v. Elkhorn-Piney Coal Mining Co., 43 S.W.2d 684 (Ky.
1931) (coal mining leasehold and its appurtenances held "real estate" for purposes of
taxation); Wakenna Coal Co. v. Johnson, 28 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1930) (lease granting
right to mine coal, cut standing timber and other rights held "real estate").
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Real Property

In William's Administrator v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,52
Kentucky's highest court held that "minerals in place are real
estate and such minerals may be severed into distinct estates
separate from the surface." 53 Moreover, leasehold estates in
mineral lands have been regarded as real estate for purposes of
conveyances5 4 liens," dower,5 6 and a variety of other transactions." Perhaps, most important to the issue at hand, Kentucky
courts have held that the rights created by a coal lease to remove
coal from the land constitutes real estate for purposes of taxation. 8 Clearly, unmined coal has been recognized as the equivalent of real property in a broad spectrum of areas.
C. Legislative Power to Classify and Exempt
The legislature's classification authority does not extend to
allow complete exemption of a class once it has been created.
Originally, the power of the legislature concerning taxation re143 S.W, 2d 297 (Ky. 1940).
" Id.

at 300.

14See, e.g., Duncan v. Mason, 39 S.W.2d 1006 (Ky. 1931) (instrument intended
to effect sale of mining property constitutes conveyance of minerals in place); Kentucky
Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner, 27 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1930) (instrument conveying title in
oil bitumen and their products held as lease); Gray-Mellon Co. v. Fairchild, 292 S.W.
743 (Ky. 1927) (deed granting oil rights held to convey interest in land); Hester v.
O'Rear, 259 S.W. 41 (Ky. 1924) (oil lease upheld as conveyance of interest).
" See, e.g., Scottsville Oil Co. v. Dye, 262 S.W. 615 (Ky. 1924) (owners of oil
and gas leases and mortgage held estopped to disclaim lien on leases); Gordon v. Hurt
& Petty, 255 S.W. 857 (Ky. 1923) (personal judgment on lien claim against oil well);
Stark v. Petty, 243 S.W. 50 (Ky. 1922) (oil lease held chattel real to which lien for work
attaches).
"6See, e.g., Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 31 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1930)
(wife, on death of husband owning mineral rights, was at once vested with dower
therein); Collins v. Lemaster, 22 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1929) (where widow and remaindermen
execute, both join in oil and gas lease); Williamson v. Williamson, 4 S.W.2d 392 (Ky.
1928) (widow granting, with remaindermen, mineral estate in land held entitled to interest
on one-third of royalty during lifetime).
" See also Brandenburg v. Petroleum Exploration, 291 S.W. 757 (Ky. 1927)
(defining extent of homestead interest); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedeman Oil Co., 277
S.W. 323 (Ky. 1924) (for purposes of partition); Kentucky Counties Oil Co. v. Culper,
265 S.W. 334 (Ky. 1924) (in the application of the statute of frauds).
8 Commonwealth v. Elkhorn-Piney Coal Mining Co., 43 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1931).
See Head v. Little, 226 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1950) (minerals may be severed from the land
by a lease and become a separate taxable estate).
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vealed that the General Assembly was authorized to completely
exempt the property of individuals or corporations, provided
that entity had performed a public service to the state.5 9 Constitutional revision of this property exemption was not addressed
until 1891. 60 Debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1890
were rigorous on the topic of taxation, 6' resulting in specified
exemptions of classes being added to the Kentucky Constitu-

tion .62
The legislature's role was consequently defined by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1937 by Martin v. High Splint Coal
Co. ,63 wherein the court reestablished the legislature's power to
categorize property into classes for the purposes of taxation.
However, the court of appeals strongly noted.that the legislature
64
was not authorized to exempt classes from taxation entirely.
Proponents of the one mil (.001) rate argue that the legislature
has in fact remained within its realm of authority by assessing
the class of unmined coal at a numerical tax rate. Conversely,
opponents propose that the one mil (.001) rate is simply a
65
numerical rate equivalent to exemption.
In 1965, the General Assembly began what is now the current
system for determining the differing classes of property and the

'9

6o
61

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
DEBATES, supra note 29.
Id., at 2418-21 (proposing a system on the income tax principle, this was labeled

fanatic); Id. at 2424 (consideration of taxing a matter of quid pro quo . . . dollar for
value and value for dollar); Id. at 2449 (expresses favorable exemptions to support state,
county or city government allowing churches, educational and charitable institutions,
public property, and cemeteries); Id. at 2453 (protesting exemption from taxation where
only basis was policy reason).
62 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 2741. Act of March 17, 1932, ch. 141, 1932 Ky.
Acts 669-70.
63 103 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Ky. 1937).
- See id. at 714.
[lit by no means follows therefrom that the right to exempt any class of
property from taxation was given to the legislature by the 1915 amendment;
since the mere right to classify for purposes of taxation does not embody
or include the right to exempt from taxation when there are constitutional
provisions against .

exemption.

Id. at 714.
65 Brief for Appellant at 16-18, Yount v. Gillis, Nos. 85-CA-2662-MR, 85-CA2717-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1987) (Gary Gillis was then Secretary of the Revenue
Cabinet).
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rate at which they would be taxed. 6 The legislature at that time
first utilized the one mil (.001) rate on a class of property 67 and
has since that time placed the disputed one mil (.001) rate on
various other classes of property with no visible dispute to the
6
contrary.

III.

Gillis v. Yount

As previously addressed, 69 the Kentucky legislature has in
recent years passed legislation which classifies and taxes property
at a one mil (.001) rate with no visible dispute. Legislative action
in 1978 dropped the rate of taxation on the separate class of
unmined coal from its previous rate70 to the one mil (.001) rate.
Taxation was based upon each one hundred dollars ($100) assessed. 71 With this drop in tax rate, litigation arose in the con73
troversial and visible 72 case of Gillis v. Yount.
Gillis examined the constitutionality of K.R.S. section
132.020(5) in both technical and practical contexts. Kentucky's
court of appeals reemphasized that Kentucky law clearly holds
that unmined coal in place is real property. The trial court
focused on the Revenue Cabinet's Annual Report, 74 in which the
First Extra Session, 1965 Ky. Acts 3-4.
67

Id. at 4 (pertaining to 0.10 of one cent tax rate upon each 100 dollars of value

assessed on farm implements or farm machinery and upon all livestock and waterfowl).
" Act of April 1, 1982, ch. 229, § 1, 1982 Ky. Acts 560 (codified at KRS §
132.020) (amended KRS § 132.020(1)) (farm implements, alcohol production facilities,
livestock and domestic fowl, tangible personal property in foreign zones); Act of April
10, 1986, ch. 431, § 1 1986 Ky. Acts 1102 (codified at KRS § 134.800) (amended KRS
§ 132.020(12) (registered motor vehicles).
69 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
70 KY. CONST. § 171.
71

Id.

Mueller, Push Resumes for Higher Tax on Unmined Coal, [sic] Lexington
Herald-Leader, Feb. 27, 1983, at DI, Col. 1 (Metro Final Edition).
11 748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988). Gillis is a consolidation of two Kentucky cases,
Gillis v. Yount and Kentucky Coal Ass'n v. Moore. In the first case Yount and other
similarly situated real property owners, claim that the statute is unconstitutional because
the General Assembly has arbitrarily classifed one type of real property from other real
property. In the second case Moore and other similarly situated automobile owners,
claim that the one mil (.001) rate is unconstitutional because it is an exemption and not
a tax. Interestingly, the trial court found the rate to be unconstitutional; the court of
appeals addressed both issues of classification and rate while the supreme court addressed
only the arbitrariness of the class.
11See infra note 77.
12
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Cabinet admitted to exercising statutory power and "for all
intents and purposes exempted unmined coal from the state
75
property tax" (by imposing a .001 per $100 rate upon it).
Furthermore, the trial court emphasized that K.R.S. section
132.020(5) achieved exemption of unmined coal from taxation
77
in two ways. 76 First, it produced a very low amount of revenue.
Secondly, it made that low amount of revenue uneconomical to
79
collect 7 and irrational to assess.
On appeal, Kentucky's court of appeals reemphasized that
Kentucky law clearly holds that unmined coal is treated as real
property. 0 The court of appeals next addressed the question
which necessarily follows, whether unmined coal must be taxed
as real property.8" The court of appeals upheld the lower court's
ruling that K.R.S. section 132.020(5) had effectively exempted
unmined coal from property taxation. 2 The court of appeals
opinion further expanded on this application of the statute by
practical example, numerically proving 3 that it is impossible to
raise revenue through K.R.S. section 132.020(5).
Unlike the trial court, Judge Gudgel, in a concurring opinion, evaluated the constitutionality of K.R.S. section 132.020(5)
addressing the separate classification issue.8 4 Judge Gudgel questioned whether it was arbitrary and unreasonable for the legislature to create a separate class for unmined coal and to tax the
coal at a much lower rate than that applicable to other real
property.8 5 Specifically noted was the tax rate variation in min" See
16

Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Ky. 1988) (Leibson, J., concurring).

Gillis v. Yount, Nos. 84-CI-815, 85-CI-589, 84-CI-867 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 1985)

(Findings of Fact No. 3).
77 KENTUCKY REVENUE CABINET, ANNUAL REPORT (1983) (total yield from levy on
unmined coal in 1983, the most current report, was $2,076 on assets worth six to twelve
billion dollars) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
71 See id. In 1978; prior to the .001 rate on unmined coal approximately 50 counties
had assessments of unmined coal on their tax books, but by 1983, this number had
fallen to 23. Id.
79 See id. (administrative costs exceeded taxation yield).
'o

See supra notes 52-58.

Yount v. Gillis, Nos. 85-CA-2662-MR, 85-CA-2717-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
1987).
Nos. 84-CI-815, 85-CI-589, 84-CI-867, slip op. at Findings of Fact No. 1.
Nos. 85-CA-2662-MR, 85-CA-2717-MR, slip op.
Id., slip op. at Judge Gudgel's concurring opinion.
85 KRS § 132.020(1).
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erals such as oil and gas as compared to coal.86 The opinion
concludes that the separation of unmined coal as a class and the
fixing of a comparably lower rate served no legitimate governmental or public purpose, and was therefore invalid.8 7
A majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court focused on the
classification question as the threshold issue on discretionary
review.88 The court is quick to establish that the Revenue Cabinet
admitted that the concept of a one mil rate was developed to
avoid the tax burden for certain types of property. 9 The question
necessarily followed whether the procedure implemented 90 to
achieve this goal is a legitimate tax avoidance or unconstitutional
tax evasion: does the method instituted to avoid the constitutional limitations in section 172 impale itself upon the constitutional limitations in sections 171 and 174? 91
Justice Leibson, writing for the majority, immediately dispenses with movants' argument that the constitutional language
is "outmoded" in that it fails to take into account the present
need to promote economic development. 92 Stressing that present
conditions are not so different as to ignore constitutional restrictions on the power of the General Assembly, Leibson draws

86

Id.

"'

Brief for Appellee, Kentucky Coal Association, Inc. (recites the governmental

purpose for the tax of 0.10 of 1076per 100 dollars assessed value on unmined coal is to
preserve the vitality of the coal industry and as a consequence strengthen Kentucky's

economy).
88 Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357, 358 (Ky. 1988).
89 Id. at 359. (These properties did not enjoy constitutional exemption but were
perceived by the General Assembly as needing de facto exemption in the public interest.).
o The two stage procedure implemented required the General Assembly to first
classify unmined coal as separate from other real estate and second to tax it at the one
mil rate.
748 S.W.2d at 359.
Id. at 359-60. Justice Leibson was unpersuaded. Quoting a portion of the
I2
Revenue Cabinet's argument:
The politics and issues of Kentucky in 1890 are as foreign to this generation
as the intrigues of ancient Rome. The Revenue provisions of the Constitution shackled the hand of the legislature to keep it from embracing the
corrupt and polluting grasp of wealthy corporations. Today there is no
need to tighten those shackles to prevent the legislature from extending a
benevolent hand to ... other [presumably the owners of unmined coal]
who honor their debt to the Commonwealth in ways worthy of legislative
consideration.
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from Russman and concludes, "law today is just as vital and
enforceable as it was the day it was written into the Constitution." 93 The court specifically notes this9 4 special tax treatment is
shown to benefit only the coal owners.
The court calls attention to the basic purpose for taxation
which is to raise revenue which, "with other resources, shall be
sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the Commonwealth
for each fiscal year." 9 Quoting United States v. Butler,96 the
court assesses its duty "to lay the article of the Constitution
which is evoked beside the statute which is challenged and decide
whether the latter squares with the former." 97
The Kentucky Supreme Court also makes clear that the
intended effect in granting additional power in local taxation9"
reflects a conscious decision by the legislature to make only one
change in the restrictions on state property taxes. 99 With this
concept established, the court narrows its focus to determine
what "classes" are defined by the Kentucky Constitution for
purposes of ad valorem taxation. Relying on the general principles stated in Board of Education of Jefferson Co. v. Board
of Education of Louisville,1°° the court summarizes that all constitutional provisions allowing classification are curtailed by limitations requiring the scheme to be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and based on an appreciable relevancy to the subject matter of
the legislation. 10 1 No legitimate purpose in promoting the function of taxation is achieved by creating a separate classification
for unmined coal. There is no justification 0 2 to create a separate

11748 S.W.2d at 360 (quoting Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Ky.
1965)).
-4Id. (The Court notes that the best argument advanced by proponents of the
special tax treatment involves assessing payment of severance taxes.).
" See KY. CONST. § 171. See also Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Commonwealth,
193 S.W.2d 749 (Ky. 1946); Gray v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 114 S.W.2d 1141,
1143 (Ky. 1938).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1935).
9'748 S.W.2d at 362.

Id. at 362-63.
I9
Id.
1w472 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1971).
0,oId. at 498.
0o2But see 748 S.W.2d at 363. Movants claim the economic importance of the coal
industry as justification to create a separate classification for unmined coal. The Ken-
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tax classification for unmined coal and to treat it differently
from all other interests in real estate, especially other interests
with similar characteristics such as oil and gas.103
In separate concurring opinions, Justice Wintersheimer and
Justice Leibson address the one mil tax rate enacted in K.R.S.
0 5 both
section 132.020(5). 04 Citing Commonwealth v. O'Harrah,'
justices conclude that the rate' °6 indirectly results in de facto
exemption from property taxation and is therefore unconstitutional. 10 7 Justice Leibson continues that this rule applies even if
the General Assembly is persuaded that the legislation is of
economic benefit'018 and popularly supported. 1°9
In a strong dissenting opinion,"10 Justice Stephenson first
refutes the "similar characteristics of oil and gas" analysis"'
presented by the majority of the Court. Justice Stephenson
contends that there are no similar characteristics between unmined coal and unmined oil and gas. As support, Justice Stephenson first explains that oil and gas cannot be assessed to
certainly exist within a tract of land" 2 and secondly, if it is

tucky Supreme Court evaluates the flaws in this argument as twofold:

1.) Assuming that coal has a special economic importance, the class and
rate does not promote the coal industry as a whole, but only the coal

owners.
2.) If the large size of the coal industry is used to justify its economic
importance, size alone does not justify a separate classification unless size
produces other qualitative differences related to the purpose of the classification.

Board of Education of Jefferson Co. v. Board of Education of Louisville, 472 S.W.2d
496, 498 (Ky. 1971).
,01748 S.W.2d at 363. Contra Id. at 371 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).

1o 748 S.W.2d at 365 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring); Id. at 366 (Liebson, J.,
concurring).
262 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1953).

Interestingly, Justice Wintersheimer in a concurring opinion writes that the
determination that KRS section 132.020(5) is unconstitutional does not in any way affect
other sections of KRS section 132.020. But see 748 S.W.2d at 371 (Justice Stephenson's

dissenting opinion).
1 748 S.W.2d at 366.
,o Id. at 369.
Id.

is also unfortunate that these cases
110Justice Stephenson begins his opinion "[i]t
caught a majority of the court in one of its 'we know better than the legislature or
anybody else' moods." 748 S.W.2d at 370 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 363.
12

Id.

at 371.
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actually determined to exist, it cannot be accurately assessed as
to its amount and value."' Regarding the practicality of the
assesment issue, Justice Stephenson observes that any accurate
assessments establishing the fair value of the unmined coal will
4
also be difficult if not impossible to obtain."
IV.

POLICY ANALYSIS

In most states the provision as to equality and uniformity is
held to preclude the legislature from either expressly exempting
part of the property from taxation, or accomplishing the same
result by failure to tax such property, except in so far as
exemptions are especially provided for by the constitution.",5
Undisputedly, the coal industry is a major economic force
in Kentucky's development. The promotion of the stability and
future growth of Kentucky's economy are legitimate purposes to
invoke statutory action." 6 However, Gillis v. Yount has invalidated K.R.S. section 132.020(5) as the means to achieve this
goal.
Gillis correctly designated unmined coal as the equivalent of
real estate for taxation purposes. " 7 However, Gillis effectively
mandated unmined coal as only a subclass of real property, not
a separate class. Along with this determination, constitutional
provisions require that the classification of real property, including unmined coal, to be taxed uniformly within the class." 8
The Kentucky Supreme Court's determination that K.R.S.
section 132.020(5) was unconstitutional, and therefore invalid,
will actually stabilize and promote the goal of future growth of
the coal industry more than the original enactment of the statute
itself. Both the Kentucky Court of Appeals"19 and the Kentucky
Id.
"I Id. at 372. See also Dolan v. Land, 667 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Ky. 1984) (setting out
113

mathematical requirements for assessing real property).
'" COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION, § 273, 580 (1924).
36 Stratford v. State-House, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (where
no fundamental right is involved, all that due process requires is that the statute or
ordinance be rationally related to some legitimate state objective).

,,7
See supra notes 52-58, and 103.
"I See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
1,9Yount v. Gillis, Nos. 85-CA-2662-MR, 85-CA-2717-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
1987).
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Supreme Court'20 examined the logical fallacies of enacting K.R.S.
section 132.020(5) as a stimulant to the coal industry. Both
excerpts convincingly rely on a theory that the coal industry is
made up of "layers of players''' 12 and only one "layer" is
benefited by the legislation. These sources suggest only a select
interest group comprised of the owners of unmined coal reap
22
the benefits of taxation.1
As a policy matter, it is interesting to note that these exempted owners are frequently absentee owners or land-holding
companies which rarely mine the coal themselves and usually
have very little contact with Kentucky.' 23 As a practical matter,
the underinclusiveness of this class allows other "players" to be
discriminated against by allowing the benefit of a low tax rate
to these few. 124 Judge Gudgel's concurring opinion at the court
of appeals level went as far as to suggest this special interest
group of owners could, contrary to the statute's purposes, hinder
coal development by waiting until the most beneficial market
125
factors occur before extracting the unmined coal.
Another viewpoint which would allow the legislature broad
discretion in classifying taxable property was expressed in Madden v. Kentucky.2 6 Advocates draw an analogy to the United
States legislature and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. 2 7 Similarly, the
leeway in congressional discretion should be given to Kentucky's
legislature. Under this analysis, the legislature's discretion would

Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d 357 (Ky. 1988).
"Layers of players" is a term used by Professor Frederick W. Whiteside,
University of Kentucky College of Law, to describe the composition of the Kentucky
coal industry.
1" 748 S.W.2d at 363 (Ky. 1988); Nos. 85-CA-2662-MR, 85-CA-2717-MR, slip op.
at J. Gudgel's concurring opinion.
23 See THE APPLACHIAN LAND OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, WHO OWNS APPALACHIA:
20

2

LAND OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT (1983).
2 748 S.W.2d at 363-64.

'2' Gillis v. Yount, Nos. 84-CI-815, 85-CI-589, 84-CI-867 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 1985).
,26Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
"I Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dept. of Revenue, 689
S.W.2d 14, 18 (Ky. 1985) (standards for classification under state constitution are the
same as those under fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution); Reynolds Metal
Co. v. Martin, 107 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 646 (power to
tax is inherent in state sovereignty except when prohibited or limited by state or Federal
Constitution).

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY

[VOL.. 4:195

be upheld as valid if the classification were reasonably related
to a legitimate purpose. 2 " Proponents of this analysis would
additionally impose a high burden of proof upon those opposed
to the classification in question. Those opposed to the class must
demonstrate that the class constitutes oppressive and hostile
discrimination. 21 9 To overcome the burden of proof, any rational
basis the legislature may have conceived in creating such a class
must be negated. 30 Furthermore, the legislature's motives 3 ' in
creating the class or the actual results'32 may not be considered.
By this rationale courts in other jurisdictions with similar constitutional classification provisions'3 3 have upheld separate classifications. 3 4 Yet the Gillis ruling distinguishes this rationale,
which is based primarily on excise taxes, from state property
taxes in the case at bar which are limited to the purpose of
raising revenue.' 35
Consequently, returning the rate on unmined coal to the
equivalent of the rate on real property creates a more suitable
means to the ends sought. More revenue will be raised by a
higher tax,3 6 and as a result there will be an incentive to collect
the revenue because administrative cost will no longer exceed
the total yield.' 37

2I Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Dept. of Revenue
v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning, 436 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Ky. 1968) (constitutional
limits on taxing new industry prohibit only classifications which are arbitrary and
unreasonable in having no relation to permissible governmental purpose); Reynolds Metal
Co. v. Martin, 107 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1937).
29

309 U.S. at 88.

542 F. Supp. at 1014.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970); Jefferson County Police Merit
Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ky. 1982); Adams v. City of Richmond, 340 S.W.
2d 204, 206 (Ky. 1960).
"I R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, 12 F. Supp. 570, 582 (W.D. Ky. 1935); Board
of Trustees v. City of Newport, 187 S.W.2d 806 (Ky. 1945).

"I M.

BERNARD, CONSTITUTIONS,

TAXATION, AND LAND POLICY (1979) (contains

abstracts of actual provisions dealing with real property taxation to be found in the
United States Constitution and in 50 state constitutions).
"I Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.. 118 A. 394, 396 (Pa. 1922), aff'd, 260 U.S.
245. Apartment Operators Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 254 N.W. 443 (Minn. 1934).
"I Gillis v. Yount, 748 S.W.2d at 364.
136 By raising the rate of taxation on unmined coal from .001 cents per 100 dollar
value assessed to the rate of real property, currently at approximately 22 cents per 100
dollar value assessed, revenue would be increased over 20 cents per 100 dollar valued.
'17 Currently the low rate of taxation on unmined coal provides no incentive to
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CONCLUSION

Gillis does not limit any rights which were in fact given
constitutionally to the legislature to create classes of property
for purposes of taxation, but instead defines coal as within a
class already created, real property. As such, unmined coal falls
under the mandatory ad valorem tax'3 s and may only be exempt
from taxation by the Constitution of Kentucky.3 9
After invalidation of K.R.S. section 132.020(5) the court
leaves unanswered additional facets of the unmined coal taxation
question. First, in construing the one mil (.001) rate of taxation
as an "effective" exemption of the class of unmined coal, has
this ruling invalidated all one mil rates? 14° Probably not. Gillis
seems to address only the legislative barrier imposed when a
unique classification of real property 14' iscreated.
Secondly, and more importantly, by invalidating K.R.S. section 132.020(5) as unconstitutional, will the state of Kentucky
be entitled to back-pay for underassessment of taxation for the
years the one mil rate was in effect? 42 If the statute is held to
be ab initio, it is as if the tax on unmined coal remained the
same as the tax on other real estate in the disputed years. 4 This
newly required revenue could be utilized immediately to help
revitalize the underfunded education system in Kentucky.'" Additional questions relating to the procedures in assessing value
of the unmined coal and timing to begin taxation at a new rate
are outside the scope of this Comment.
collect the almost non-existent revenue created from this taxation. With an increase in
the tax rate, administrative costs would no longer outweigh the total amount of revenue
yielded.
"I Miller v. Covington Development Auth., 539 S.W.2d 2 (Ky. 1976). See KY.
CONST. § 174; Raydure v. Board of Sup'rs. of Estill County, 209 S.W. 19, 25 (Ky.
1919); Levi v. City of Louisville, 30 S.W. 973, 974 (Ky. 1895).
139 KY. CONST. § 3.
1 See supra notes 66-68, 106 and accompanying text.
' But see 748 S.W.2d at 372 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
142 Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566 (1913); City of Henderson
v. Lieber's Ex'r, 192 S.W. 830, 831 (Ky. 1917) (construing an unconstitutional statute
as one which has no effect).
,41This would require property value assessors (P.V.A.'s) to reassess taxes on
unmined coal property from 1978 to the present to compute the amount each was
underassessed and then to fine accordingly.
'- The Council for Better Education v. Wallace Wilkinson, Governor, 85-Ci-1759
(Franklin Cir. Ct. May 31, 1988).
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Gillis v. Yount is a narrow interpretation of the legislature's
authority to subdivide the class of real property. The decision
in holding K.R.S. section 132.020(5) unconstitutional corrects an
effective exemption of unmined coal from taxation and allows
for a higher tax rate. This result is consistent with the ultimate
goal of raising revenue by taxation.
ROBIN
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